Abstract-In GSM-WLAN heterogeneous networks, the authentication efficiency is one of the drawbacks for message transaction and processing in the RADIUS server. This paper proposed two fast authentication schemes, based on the EAP-SIM mechanism, to improve the authentication efficiency by balancing the message transaction loads and processing loads among the RADIUS server and individual APs. In this paper, the IEEE 802.11 WLAN simulation mode based on the Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) is used to evaluate the performance including the authentication session time, message transaction load and processing load for the proposed authentication schemes and the conventional EAP-SIM authentication schemes. The results show that the proposed full authentication scheme can save about 20% authentication session time compared to the conventional full authentication scheme, and the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme can save about 75% authentication session time compared to the conventional fast re-authentication scheme. Therefore, the authentication efficiency of the proposed schemes is better than that with the conventional authentication schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the mobility and the growing requirement for the data transmission, several radio access networks are applied to provide the data services, for example Global System for Mobile communications (GSM), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN), and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) [1] [2] [3] [4] . In order to provide a high data transmission and high mobility with wide area coverage, heterogeneous network is one of candidates to integrate those wireless network systems in the future wireless mobile communications [5] [6] [7] [8] . For example, GSM-WLAN heterogeneous interworking approach makes the better usage of the advantages of each network type and can complement each other in terms of coverage, bandwidth, and cost. Hence, heterogeneous network becomes significant in the mobile communication [9] [10] [11] .
However, using this technique, there are still some difficulties needed to be implemented, such as authentication, quality of service, seamless handoff, roaming, mobility management, and charging problems in the heterogeneous interworking. Among those drawbacks, authentication service is a most important topic in order to guarantee the authorization of a mobile terminal for data transmission under the heterogeneous wireless environment through secret credentials.
In order to provide the authentication and the security services in the heterogeneous wireless networks, several security mechanisms are proposed, such as EAP-AKA [12] and EAP-SIM [13] . EAP-SIM is one of security mechanisms to support the integration of GSM system and WLAN mobile network. It is also used to provide a mutual authentication scheme between GSM-based integrated mobile phone network using the GSM security schemes to ensure that only valid WLAN user could access to the GSM network. Besides, EAP-SIM can provide better security properties than that with GSM and WLAN mechanisms, respectively [13] . With the centralized authentication mechanism, all the mutual authentication procedures are involved with the Remote Authentication Dial in User Service (RADIUS)/ Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server and GSM authentication center (GSM-AuC). Besides, the processing loads and message transaction loads are centralized within the RADIUS/AAA server. Hence, those loads are also increased exponentially when the huge wireless clients request to access service frequently. The authentication efficiency of the EAP-SIM mechanism would be degraded by those inherent drawbacks.
In order to combat those drawbacks, the decentralized authentication schemes are proposed previously [14] . The concept of those schemes is to transfer, the authentication vectors of each user, from the RADIUS server to the local APs during the conventional full authentication process.
In addition, the complete fast re-authentication scheme could be functioned by the local APs instead of the RADIUS server while the wireless client is re-connected to the WLAN network. Moreover, the local APs could reuse last-time authentication vector, as the seeds of key generation functions, to generate new authentication vector for the next fast re-authentication scheme. Based on the proposed fast authentication scheme, the huge processing load and message transaction load for the RADIUS server would be uniformly distributed to the local APs. Besides, the performance of the conventional authentication schemes and the proposed authentication schemes are evaluated by Network Simulator 2 (NS-2) for wireless software and the results show the proposed scheme are capable of improving the authentication efficiency of the conventional EAP-SIM mechanism. In this paper, the performance evaluation of the decentralized authentication schemes is shown, and the performances on the authentication session time, message transaction load, and processing load of different network entity for the authentication scheme are given. In the following sections, the conventional EAP-SIM mechanism is presented. Section III describes the architecture and the procedures of the decentralized fast authentication schemes in detail. In Section IV, the simulation results and performance evaluation for the proposed schemes are presented. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section V.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL EAP-SIM MECHANISM
A typical architecture of the conventional EAP-SIM authentication mechanism is illustrated in Figure 1 . Two schemes are applied in Figure 1 . One is the full authentication scheme and the other is the fast reauthentication scheme. The fast re-authentication scheme is always operated based on the succeeded full authentication scheme. In general, four network entities, GSM-AuC, RADIUS server, local APs, and wireless clients, are presented to achieve the security subfunctions of the full authentication scheme. In addition, three network entities, RADIUS server, local APs, and wireless clients, are presented to achieve the security subfunctions of the fast re-authentication scheme [13] . The full authentication scheme and the fast re-authentication are described in the following sections. 
A. Full Authentication Scheme
Four sub-functions are implemented in the conventional full authentication scheme in Figure 2 . Those are version negotiation, key generation, mutual authentication, and encryption, respectively.
The major function of the version negotiation is to negotiate the algorithm versions and to deliver relative security attributes (Version_List, Selected_Version, Nonce_MT) between the RADIUS server and wireless clients. The Version_List and Selected_Version attributes are listed the supporting version for the RADIUS server and wireless clients, respectively. The Nonce_MT attribute is not only generated randomly by the wireless client for protecting against replay attacks, but used as a seed value for the new keying material.
After achieving the version negotiation, GSM-AuC, RADIUS server, and wireless clients hold enough authentication vectors to execute key generation procedures, individually. Here, A8, SHA-1, and PRF [13] key generation functions is applied to generate Kcs, Master Key (MK), Transient EAP keys (TEKs), Master Session Key (MEK) and Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). In addition, TEKs is composed of two keys, K_auth and K_encr. The key generation procedures can be referred to [13] .
The mutual authentication sub-function is composed of identity authentication and HMAC authentication. The mutual authentication session is based on a challengeresponse mechanism and specifies an optional support for protecting the privacy of subscriber identity using the pseudonyms or temporary identifiers. In the identity authentication, the RADIUS server can identify users with the Network Access Identifier (NAI) mechanism [13] and extract the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) information from the user's identity. Based on the IMSI information, GSM-AuC can authenticate the legal user and look up the correct secret key Ki which is belonged to the specific user. With the secret key Ki, GSM-AuC could generate multiple triples (Rand, Kc, RES). In the HMAC authentication, the RADIUS server applies the HMAC-SHA1-128 function to generate the message authentication code, AT_MAC and AT_RES attributes [13] . Therefore, the RADIUS server needs to be verified to the wireless client by the AT_MAC attribute. On the other word, the wireless client shows as a legal user to the RADIUS server by the AT_RES attribute. For the security of the WLAN network, the EAP-SIM mechanism supports several schemes for link layer security. One is the traditional Wireless Enhancement Privacy (WEP) which is specified by IEEE 802.11 standards. However, in order to overcome these weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the WEP, the advanced security protocol, IEEE 802.11i, is also adopted to the EAP-SIM mechanism for the highest level of privacy. The 802.11i specification includes the RC4 based encryption Temporal Key Integrity Protocol and Advance Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) for confidentiality and integrity protection.
B. Fast Re-Authentication Scheme
The EAP-SIM mechanism provides an optional fast reauthentication scheme for the RADIUS server and wireless clients. Because the fast re-authentication scheme does not need new triplets from the GSM-AuC, therefore, the fast re-authentication scheme can be performed in fewer roundtrips than that with the full authentication scheme. Basically, it is usually worked based on the successful full authentication scheme and some attributes, MK, K_encr, K_auth, and fast reauthentication identity, also need to be stored in the RADIUS server and wireless clients. In Figure 3 , four sub-functions, key generation, synchronization, mutual authentication and encryption, are implemented.
In the initial state of the fast re-authentication scheme, some attributes, the RADIUS server and wireless clients are included to realize the key generation function. Here, they also applied SHA-1 and PRF key generation algorithms to generate new key sets including MK', K_auth' and K_encr' keys. The key generation procedures are shown in the reference [13] .
The mutual authentication sub-function in the fast reauthentication scheme is similar to that in the full authentication scheme. The challenge-response skill and the support for protecting the privacy of subscriber identity using the fast re-authentication identifiers are applied. Besides, both the RADIUS server and wireless clients are verified each other via the AT_MAC and AT_RES attributes.
In the synchronization process, the counter attribute is the main security attribute. It is contributed to the keying material, used to limit the numbers of successive reauthentication exchanges, and protected the RADIUS server and wireless clients from replays. The synchronization process is given in the reference [13] .
Based on the same encryption schemes, the fast reauthentication scheme still supported the traditional WEP and the advanced security protocol IEEE 802.11i which includes the RC4-based TKIP and AES-based CCMP.
According to the previous descriptions, the fast reauthentication scheme can be performed in fewer roundtrips than the full authentication scheme. Therefore, the authentication efficiency of the fast re-authentication scheme is better than that with the full authentication scheme. However, the message transaction loads and processing loads within the RADIUS server are increased exponentially as wireless clients' authentication requests as a result of the centralized authentication session. So, the unbalancing message transaction loads and processing loads among the RADIUS server and APs can influence the authentication efficiency and can be bottlenecks of the conventional EAP-SIM mechanism. In order to combat these weaknesses, the proposed fast authentication schemes are presented in the following section.
III. THE PRPOSED FAST AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
The fast authentication scheme, based on the EAP-SIM mechanism, can be divided into two authentication schemes. One is called as the proposed full authentication scheme; the other is the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme. Figure 4 presents the function blocks for the proposed full authentication scheme, which is modified from the conventional full authentication scheme. It is not only transferred authentication vectors of the each user from GSM-AuC to the RADIUS server database, but the authentication vectors are pre-loaded to the associated APs' database during the proposed full authentication process. Besides, it makes APs can perform the HMAC authentication function as shown with shading without the RADIUS server as comparing to the results in Figure 2 . The proposed iterative fast authentication is also succeeded to the proposed full authentication scheme and it eliminates the need for communication with the RADIUS server when the re-authentication actually takes place. Besides, the key point is to iteratively run key generation, mutual authentication, synchronization, and encryption sub-functions, as shown with the shading in Figure 5 , on the local AP while the fast re-authentication takes place regularly.
A. The Proposed Full Authentication Scheme
When the wireless client is located at the service of the WLAN and it receives the AP's advertisement signal, the steps of signal transfer are shown in Figure 6 . STEP 1-5 Initially, the wireless client joints to the GSM mobile system and launches the authentication process. The AP immediately sends an identity request packet to the wireless client. Then, the wireless client sends a response packet with IMSI information to the AP. After receiving the identity, the AP relays user's identity to the RADIUS server. Then, the RADIUS server sends Auth_Info packet with IMSI information to GSM-AuC. GSM-AuC uses the specific user's secret key Ki, according to the IMSI information, and the random number (RAND) as the input to the A3 and A8 algorithms to generate n (n=3 or 5 typically) GSM triplet which is formed by the three attributes, RAND, Kc and RES. After generating multiple triplets, GSM-AuC sends an Auth_Info_Ack packet with multiple triplets to the RADIUS server.
STEP 6 It is a version negotiation process which can be referred to [13] . After finishing version negotiation process, both the RADIUS server and wireless client can obtain the Version_List, Selected_Version and Nonce_MT attributes. Then, the RADIUS sever applies the SHA-1 and PRF function to generate the key sets (MK, K_auth, K_encr). Besides, the message authentication code, AT_MAC and AT_RES attributes, are generated by the HMAC-SHA1-128 function, respectively. Furthermore, for the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme, the RADIUS server must generate a new temporal identity called as the fast pseudo identity and protected by an AES algorithm with K_encr key and initial vector AT_IV. Besides, the fast pseudo identity, multiple triplets, key sets and the message authentication code must be stored in the database of the RADIUS server.
STEP 7
The RADIUS server sends a packet including n*RAND, key sets, message authentication code, fast pseudo identity, AT_IV and *AT_Encr_Data to the AP and those attributes are stored in the APs' database immediately. This step is difference from the original full authentication scheme and it has two purposes. One is the preparations for the remainder procedures which can be executed by the AP without the RADIUS server. The other is the preparations for the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme in advance. STEP 9 On receipt of the EAP-Request packet, the wireless client gets into the key generation, message authentication code generation, and HMAC Authentication functions. In the key generation process, the key sets (MK, K_encr, K_auth) could be obtained. In addition, the message authentication code (AT_MAC and AT_SRES) also can be obtained in the message authentication code generation process. Then the verification of the AT_MAC can be preformed. If failed, the wireless client sends a client-error packet to the AP. Then the AP immediately announces an authentication failure message to the RADIUS serve and requests to initiate a new proposed full authentication. Besides, the AP also sends a client-error notification packet to the wireless client for terminating the proposed full authentication exchanges and initiating a new proposed full authentication.
STEP 10 If the AT_MAC does match, the wireless client responds with a packet that covers the AT_SRES attributes to the AP.
STEP 11 On receipt of the AT_SRES attribute, the verification of the AT_SRES would be preformed by the AP. If the received AT_SRES matches the one stored in the database of the AP, AP sends an EAP-Success message to indicate the proposed full authentication scheme is successful. Otherwise, the AP immediately announces an authentication failure message to the RADIUS serve and requests to renew the proposed full authentication scheme. STEP 12 As the above steps are completed, the wireless client can obtain the fast pseudo identity by the K_encr key and the fast pseudo identity is used for the proposed iterative fast authentication. Then both the AP and the wireless client will get into the ciphering mode.
After the STEP 7, the APs have sufficient information for performing the remainder authentication procedures which are original worked by the RADIUS server. By this design, the processing loads and message transaction loads within the RADIUS server can be shared with APs and the number of roundtrips in the proposed full authentication scheme are fewer than that in the conventional full authentication scheme.
B. The Proposed Iterative Fast Authentication Scheme
The proposed iterative fast authentication scheme is worked based on the successful proposed full authentication scheme. In the initial state, APs and wireless clients should possess authentication vectors prestored during the preceding proposed full authentication scheme. When the wireless client is located at the WLAN service and it receives the AP's advertisement signal, the steps of signal transfer are shown in Figure 7 . STEP 1-2 Firstly, the wireless client joints to the WLAN and products an EAPOL-Start packet to the AP to launch the authentication process. Then, the AP sends an EAP-Request/Identity packet to the wireless client to request for a legal fast pseudo identity. After receiving the fast pseudo identity, AP can verify the identity pre-stored in the database and agree for using an iterative fast authentication. If the AP can not recognize the fast pseudo identity, the iterative fast authentication should be terminated and back to the proposed full authentication. In the conventional fast re-authentication scheme, the identity authentication must be performed in the RADIUS server. Here, this operation is worked in the APs. From now on, the RADIUS server totally is replaced by the AP in the iterative fast authentication. As using an iterative fast authentication, the AT_Nonce_A and AT_Counter_A attributes should be generated by the AP in advance. The random AT_Nonce_A attribute is protected against replay attacks and the AT_Counter_A attribute also has three functions which are mentioned in Section II. Then, the AP can obtain new key sets (MK', K_encr', K_auth') by the key generation process which is referred to [13] . Besides, the message authentication code, AT_MAC' and AT_RES' attributes, are generated by the HMAC-SHA1-128 function, respectively. For the next iterative fast authentication, the AP must generate the new fast pseudo1 identity, which must be protected by an AES algorithm with the new K_encr' key. Besides both the AT_Nonce_A and AT_Counter_A attributes are protected by the AES algorithm with the original K_encr key. Moreover, for the next iterative fast authentication, new key sets (MK', K_encr', K_auth'), new message authentication code (AT_MAC', AT_RES'), Counter_A, and fast pseudo1 identity attributes must be pre-stored in the APs' database.
STEP 3 The AP sends the packet including AT_MAC', AT_IV, *AT_Counter_A, *AT_Nonce_A, and *AT_Encr_Data to the wireless client. On receipt of the packet, the *AT_Counter_A, *AT_Nonce_A attributes must be decrypted with original K_ency key stored in the database of the wireless client. Then the wireless client can acquire the new key sets (MK', K_encr', K_auth') by running the key generation process. Besides, both new message authentication code AT_MAC' and AT_SRES' also can be obtained by running the HMAC-SHA1-128 function, respectively. STEP 4 For the HMAC authentication process, the verification of the AT_MAC' would be preformed by the wireless client. If the AT_MAC' is not match, the wireless client sends a client-error packet to the AP. Then the AP immediately announces an authentication failure to the RADIUS serve and requests to initiate the new proposed full authentication. In addition, the AP also sends a client-error notification to the wireless client for terminating the iterative fast authentication exchanges and initiating the new proposed full authentication. If the AT_MAC' is match, the synchronization process would be performed sequentially.
STEP 5 The synchronization process is referred to [13] . If the synchronization is failed, the wireless client sends the synchronization failure packet, including the AT_Counter_too_small, AT_Counter_A and AT_MAC' attributes, to the AP. On receipt of the synchronization failure packet, the AP must verify AT_MAC' and AT_Counter_A contained the same counter value as in the EAPRequest/SIM/iterative fast authentication packet. If not, the AP immediately terminates the iterative fast authentication exchanges. Otherwise, the AP transmits a new EAPRequest/SIM/Start packet and the proposed full authentication scheme is performed as usual.
STEP 6-7 If synchronization check is successful, the wireless client responds a packet, covering AT_SRES' response value and AT_Counter_A encrypted with K_encr' key, to the AP. Then, the AP must verify the AT_SRES' and AT_Counter_A attributes. If those checks are failed, the AP sends a client-error notification to the wireless client for terminating the iterative fast authentication exchanges and initiating the proposed full authentication. Otherwise, the AP would send an EAP-Success packet to indicate the iterative fast authentication is succeeded. Then, the wireless client can obtain the fast pseudo1 identity via the K_encr' key, and the fast pseudo1 identity is used for the next iterative fast authentication scheme.
STEP 8
As completing the above process, both the AP and wireless client get into the ciphering mode. The functions of the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme are performed by APs and wireless clients without the RADIUS server. Besides, the processing loads within the RADIUS server are totally distributed to APs, and the numbers of message roundtrips in the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme are lower than that in the conventional fast reauthentication scheme. Hence, the authentication efficiency is better than that with the conventional fast reauthentication scheme. Furthermore, the iterative process of the proposed iterative fast authentication will be terminated when a failed iterative fast authentication or a failed synchronization check is occurred.
In this paper, the proposed full authentication and the proposed iterative fast authentication are integrated with the fast authentication schemes. The proposed fast authentication schemes can increase the authentication efficiency, authentication vectors of the each user are prestored in the AP's database and key sets are derived on the preceding proposed full authentication or the proposed iterative fast authentication, for balancing the processing loads and message transaction loads among the RADIUS serve and APs.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performances on the average authentication session time, processing time and message transaction loads of network entity associated with the different authentication schemes are given. The simulations are based on the Network Simulator 2 (NS2) with WLAN module [15] developed by the University of Delaware. The NS2 IEEE 802.11 WLAN model is used to support the MAC layer in the infrastructure mode. Besides, in this paper, the simulation parameters are shows in TABLE I. Figure 8 shows the average authentication session time for the different authentication schemes. For the conventional EAP-SIM mechanism, the average authentication session times are 101.938 and 55.043 (ms), respectively. The fast re-authentication scheme can save 47% authentication session time for the full authentication scheme. For the proposed authentication schemes, the average authentication session times are 82.567 and 13.761 (ms), respectively. The proposed full authentication scheme can save 20% authentication session time compared to the conventional full authentication scheme and the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme can save 75% authentication session time compared to the conventional fast reauthentication scheme. Besides, the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme has the fewest authentication session time than other authentication schemes. Therefore, the simulation results show that the proposed fast authentication schemes can improve the authentication efficiency of the conventional EAP-SIM mechanism. In Figure 9 (a), for the RADIUS server, the fast reauthentication scheme must spend the huge processing time than other authentication scheme due to the centralized authentication session. However, for the proposed full authentication scheme, the partial processing loads within the RADIUS server are transferred to the APs. Hence, the processing time is lower than the conventional full authentication scheme. Besides, for the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme, the total processing loads within the RADIUS server are distributed to APs. Therefore, the processing time of the proposed fast iterative authentication scheme is the lowest one among four authentication schemes. For the AP, Figure 9 (b) illustrates that the huge processing time must be consumed in the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme as the results of the processing loads forwarded from the RADIUS server. Besides, the processing time is increased exponentially with an increasing number of the wireless nodes. As the processing loads within the RADIUS server are divided into that with the associated APs. APs maybe hold the high processing loads, however, the authentication efficiency is guaranteed in the proposed fast iterative fast authentication scheme.
For the RADIUS server, the conventional full authentication scheme needs 8 message transactions among the GSM-AuC and local APs for exchanging the triples and working authentication processes, and version negotiation sub-function. However, the conventional fast re-authentication scheme only needs 4 message transactions for authentication and synchronization subfunction. Hence, the message transaction load within the RADIUS server in the conventional full authentication scheme is increased approximately 50% than that in the conventional fast re-authentication scheme. Moreover, all sub-functions of the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme is not functioned by the RADIUS server. Therefore, no message transaction load is occurred within the RADIUS server in Figure 10 (a) .
For the single local AP, there are 15 and 11 message transactions in the conventional full authentication scheme and the conventional fast re-authentication scheme, respectively. Besides, the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme needs only 7 message transactions for all security sub-functions. Hence, Figure 10 (b) illustrates that the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme can be accomplished with the smallest message transactions than that with other authentication schemes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, two improved authentication schemes based on EAP-SIM mechanism in GSM-WLAN heterogeneous mobile networks are proposed. The results show that the authentication efficiency in the proposed full authentication scheme and the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme are both performed better than that in the conventional full authentication scheme and the fast re-authentication scheme, respectively. Besides, for the RADIUS server, the processing loads and message transaction loads with the proposed full authentication scheme are lower than that with the conventional full authentication scheme. Moreover, the processing loads and message transaction loads with the proposed iterative fast authentication scheme are lower than that with the conventional fast re-authentication one. Hence, the performance shows that the authentication efficiency in the fast authentication scheme is better than that with the conventional one.
